The existing literature ignores the fact that in most European countries the strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) varies across the firm size distribution. In Italy firms are obliged to rehire an unfairly dismissed worker only if they employ more than 15 employees. Theoretically, the paper solves a baseline model of EPL with threshold effects, and shows that firms close to the threshold should be characterized by an increase in inaction and by a reluctance to grow. Empirically, the paper estimates transition probability matrices on firm level employment using a longitudinal data set based on Italian Social Security (INPS) records, and finds two results. First, firms close to the 15 employees threshold experience an increase in persistence of 1.5 percent with respect to a baseline statistical model. Second, firms with 15 employees are more likely to move backward than upward. Finally, the paper tests the effect of a 1990 reform which tightened the regulation on individual dismissal only for small firms. It finds that the persistence of small firms relative to large firms increased significantly. Overall, these threshold effects are significant and robust, but quantitatively small. JEL Classification: J4
Introduction
Over the last decade, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) has attracted a large interest among labour economists and policy makers. The accumulated empirical evidence and theoretical analysis has greatly improved the overall understanding of the effects of EPL on the aggregate labour markets. The main empirical regularities are as follows. EPL reduces unemployment inflows and outflows, but it has ambiguous effects on aggregate employment stocks. In addition, EPL has important effects on the composition of employment, since countries with stricter EPL are associated with higher youth unemployment and larger self employment. These empirical regularities, recently surveyed by the OECD (1999) , are broadly in line with the existing theoretical models, who treat EPL as a tax on labour shedding (Bentolila Bertola, 1990, and Bertola, 1999) .
Most of the traditional empirical literature works with macroeconomic data, and analyses the effects of EPL on aggregate labour markets flows and stocks. More recently, different scholars have used individual and firm level data for analysing the effects of EPL policy reforms. Acemouglu and Angrist (2001) have studied the effects of the Employment Disability Act, while Kugler (1999) has studied the effect of the EPL reform in Colombia. Further, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) have compared the labour market dynamics of U.S. and Portugal, and have found that despite their similar unemployment level, Portugal experiences much lower worker flows in and out of unemployment.
Despite the growing number of studies on EPL based on individual and firm level data, little or no attention has been devoted to the effect of EPL on the size distribution of firms, and on the behaviour of firms of different size 1 . This is surprising, since in most European countries the existing legislation varies across firms of different size. The case of Italy stands out in this respect. In the existing legislation firms with more than 15 employees are obliged to rehire the dismissed employee when a judge rules the dismissal unfair. Small firms, by contrast, are only obliged to compensate the dismissed worker with a monetary transfer.
Theoretically, the paper solves a baseline model of EPL with threshold effects, and shows that firms close to the threshold should be characterized by an increase in inaction and by a reluctance to grow. Empirically, the paper uses firm level data drawn from the Italian Social Security (INPS)
Records, and studies whether the existence of the 15 employees threshold modifies employment dynamics, and whether firms' inaction vis-à-vis employment increases close to the 15 employees threshold, as our baseline theoretical model predicts. The paper finds a significant, albeit quantitatively small, threshold effect.
Specifically, the paper estimates transition probability matrices for a sample of some 30,000
Italian firms between 1987 and 1996. While the probability of inaction decreases markedly with firm size, it experiences a significant spike in the region below the threshold. Indeed, the paper finds that firms employing 14 and 15 employees have a probability of inaction that is 1.5 percent higher than what different non linear statistical models would predict. Similarly, the difference between the probability of moving down and moving up by one position falls slightly with firm size, but it features a 1.6 percent spike around the 15 employees threshold. Finally, the paper estimates the effect of a 1990
reform which tightened EPL on small firms relatively to EPL on large firms. The paper finds that the persistence of small firms relatively to large firms increased significantly after 1990.
Our paper fits into the empirical EPL literature, and provides fresh evidence on employment dynamics associated to asymmetric EPL across the firm size distribution. While the paper provides some empirical facts on the Italian size distribution, and on the large weight represented by small firms, we do not directly address the small size bias of the Italian economy. Further, we do not estimate the general equilibrium effects that such threshold effects may play. Finally, we do not address efficiency and equity arguments linked to the existence of EPL thresholds, which are taken as given throughout the paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reports some stylised facts on the Italian firm size distribution, and on job and worker flows. Section 3 looks at the existing legislation, and describes the labour market institutions that apply only to firms of certain size, with particular emphasis on the EPL differential. Section 4 presents a toy model of EPL with threshold effects, and derives two empirical predictions. Section 5 describes the dataset used in the empirical analysis, and presents the methodological approach pursued in the paper. Section 6 presents the results in terms of firm level persistence and firm level probability of increasing and decreasing by one position. Section 7 looks at the 1990 EPL reform which increased firing costs for small firms relatively to large firms. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
Stylised Facts on Italy: Firm Size Distribution, Job And Worker Flows
Since the late 70's, the firm size distribution in most OECD economies has experienced an increase in the share of small firms. The share of employment in firms with less than 100 employees has increased in several countries, including Italy, the United States, France and U.K. In most OECD countries, the relative increase in the employment weight of small firms took place through a reduction in the absolute employment of firms with more than 500 employees. In Italy, conversely, we observe an actual increase in the absolute employment of firms of smaller size (Traù, 1999) . This suggests that small firms are quantitatively more important in Italy relatively to other OECD economies.
Using a comparable dataset recently assembled by the OECD, and summarized by Bartelsman et al. (2001) , it is possible to offer some insights in the Italian specificity: 34 percent of workers are employed in firms with less than 20 employees, against 24 percent in France and Germany, and 17 percent in the United States. In the manufacturing sector, an average Italian firm employs 14.4 workers, against 24 in France, 53 in the United Kingdom and 75 in the United States. In the business sector, the average size of the Italian firms is 8.1 employees, only larger than the Netherlands, and lower than that of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Which factors can explain the Italian specificity on small firms? Traditionally, the literature emphasized the Italian comparative advantage in the small business sector. More recently, many authors associate the excess of small firms with credit market imperfections, labour market institutions that differ across firm size, fiscal and legal requirements increasing with firm size, as well as sociological factors (large share of family based entrepreneurs lacking managerial skills necessary to handle large businesses) (Traù, 1999) . This paper looks at the role of labour market institutions, and studies the effects of such institutions on employment dynamics. While we find links between employment dynamics and the institutional setting, our evidence does not address directly the small size bias of the Italian economy. As we argue in the conclusions, establishing the links between institutional constraints and the role of small firms requires further research.
While EPL in Italy is among the most stringent across the OECD (OECD, 1999), existing evidence suggests that job turnover rates of small and large firms are as large as those observed in other OECD economies (OECD, 1994 The large worker and job turnover observed in most European countries, despite their high job security provisions, has generated an ongoing debate. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) argue that these statistics should not be surprising, especially when we realize that in Europe strict EPL is often associated with large wage rigidity. In Contini (2002) , some empirical evidence on this point is provided. Boeri (1999) suggests that the high turnover observed in Europe is mainly due to the increasing incidence of temporary jobs, and the associated job-to-job movements. Garibaldi (2003) argues that time consuming firing, a typical European phenomenon, increases job to job movements and reduces unemployment flows, in line with the evidence across countries. Blanchard and Portugal (2001) , in their comparison between US and Portugal, show that the similarity of turnover rates is observed only with yearly statistics, and disappears at higher frequencies, suggesting that EPL has important effects only on high frequency shocks. With this background in mind, we turn to the Italian institutional setting.
Employment Protection Legislation and Firm Size: The Italian Institutional
Setting.
Within the Italian Institutional settings, there are five types of regulations that depend on firm's size.
The institutional areas involved are the following: employment protection legislation, mandatory quotas on hiring, firm level rights to organize union related institutions, firms safety standards and collective dismissals rules. The existence of rules and constraints to be applied only to larger firms can potentially affect firms' size, can push firms to enter in markets in which the optimal long-run position is below the thresholds, and can affect the geographical location of firms and establishments.
The most important institutional constraint is linked to the individual dismissal procedures, as legislated in the Article 18 of the labour code. Within the Italian institutional setting, individual dismissals must be justified by a just cause rule, and workers have the right to appeal firm initiated dismissals 3 . Whenever a judge rules the dismissal unfair, workers are entitled to a compensation that depends crucially on firm size. Firms employing less than 15 employees must compensate the unlawfully dismissed workers for the foregone wages, and pay a severance payment that varies between 2.5 and 6 months (tutela obbligatoria). In alternative to the severance payment, small firms have the option (but they are not obliged) to reinstate the unlawfully dismissed worker. Conversely, firms employing more than 15 workers must not only compensate the worker for the foregone wages, but are also obliged to rehire the worker (Article 18, tutela reale). 4 If the worker does not exercise the option to be reinstated, he or she can receive a severance payment of 15 months. Even though the large majority of dismissals does not go to court and is settled through pre-trial agreements, the threat of reinstatement is always present, and it is the relevant constraint whose effects we analyse.
It is also important to stress how the labour code computes the 15 employees threshold relevant for Article 18, tutela reale. First of all, the 15 employees refer to establishments rather than to firms, and to different establishments as long as they are located within the same city. In addition, the 15 employees refer to the date in which the firing was intimated, which can be ahead of the actual separation date. Further, apprentices and temporary workers below nine months should not be computed. Conversely, part-time workers should be included in proportion on to their actual time, and all other temporary contracts should be counted. Finally, any form of employment which does not classify as dependent employment (interim workers, full-time and part-time consultants) should not be included in the labour code based definition of employment. These measurement issues are relevant in the empirical strategy discussed in Section 5.
Notice that there are other relevant constraints that apply above a given threshold 5 . Firms employing more than 10 workers, are obliged to hire disadvantaged workers, which refer to officially registered long term unemployed. Further, as of 1999, firms employing more than 15 workers must employ disabled workers. 6 Further, rules of the labour code linked to union related activity applies only to firms employing more than 15 employees. Such norms entitle workers to establish a firm level institution (Rappresentanze Sindacali Aziendali) that has the right to call general meetings, establish referendum, and post union related poster within the establishments. Also, firms with more than 15 employees have the right to vote for a worker representative for safety related issues. Finally, since 3 Here we refer to objective just cause (economic reasons). Subjective just causes (as misconduct) are linked to worker behaviour, and are not the object of our theoretical analysis. In practice, however, it is only a judge ruling that defines a specific situation as subjective or objective. 4 Notice that this case is different from discriminatory dismissals (based on race, gender, political opinions for example), where reinstatement is automatic and independent of firm size. 5 These thresholds are computed according to rules that are somehow different from those relevant for Article 18 detailed above. 6 As we discuss in section 5, our dataset refers to the period 1987-1995, so those mandatory rules on disabled workers are not binding in our time period. 
A Toy Model of EPL with Threshold Effects
EPL is traditionally modelled as a firing tax on labour shedding, and the original theoretical framework is the dynamic labour demand under uncertainty. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) characterize the optimal employment strategy of a monopolistic firm subject to idiosyncratic shocks and firing costs, holding wages fixed. Most of this literature takes EPL as given, and looks at the employment effect of different degrees of job security provisions. A very simple exposition of the Bertola-Bentolila model is the one of Schivardi (2000). To the best of our knowledge, there are no explicit models that derive employment predictions when EPL is binding only for firms larger than a given size. In this section, we build on the work of Schivardi (2000) and Bertola (1999) , and introduce threshold effects in a toy model of labour demand. This section proceeds as follows. First, we solve for the efficient allocation, next we show the properties of the model with an extreme form of EPL. Finally, we introduce threshold effects, and derive the main empirical predictions on firm level dynamics.
The Set-Up of the Model
We assume that there is a continuum of firms of mass 1, and that wages are exogenously fixed and equal to w. Each firm hires only labour and produces and sells a homogenous output with a convex production function y=f (α, ,l) , where α is a stochastic shifter of labor demand, l is the quantity of labour employed, and is a fixed-firm-specific parameter heterogeneous across firms. 
The Efficient Allocation
Assume now that each type-firm can choose the optimal employment level after observing the realization of the shock α, and assume that hiring and firing can take place at no cost. Firm optimal employment behaviour is obtained simply by maximizing profits in each period, so that the firm continuously set the marginal product equal to the wage, or 
The Rigid System
Assume now that EPL is so strict that firing is impossible. A type-firm will then choose a level of employment that maximizes average profits, and will keep its employment constant at all time. In other words, a type-firm will choose a level of employment to maximize average expected profits
where R ( ,l) are the profits for a type-firm in the rigid system. If we indicate with l R ( ) the result of the maximization, its expression reads
Confronting the rigid and the efficient allocation, an important implication immediately follows.
Result 1. Average employment for a type-firm in the efficient and in the rigid allocation is
identical. The result is obtain by simple inspection of l R ( ), which can be written as ( -w) . But then l R ( ) is the average level of employment of a type-firm in the efficient allocation.
Further, profits are larger in the efficient allocation, as long as p is different from 0 and 1. To obtain the latter result simply observe that profits in the rigid system are
which is an expression that is always lower than E* as long as p is strictly positive and less than one.
In addition, one can also observe that firm employment in the rigid system is less volatile than in the efficient allocation, since firms never hire and fire. These results are the standard implications of the EPL literature with fixed wages, and are just reported for introducing threshold effects, on which we turn next 9 .
The Role of Threshold Effects
Assume now that the rigid regime is enforced only for employment level larger than l thr , where l thr is an exogenous threshold specified by the legislation. The only restriction we impose is that l thr >a b -w, 
With threshold effects, some firms have to choose between a rigid allocation and a stay small policy. In the former case they have an employment base larger than the threshold, they permanently employ l R ( ), and never fire. In the latter case, they permanently fluctuate inside the flexible fringe of the size distribution.
To complete our description, we need to characterize the conditions that insure that scared firms exist in equilibrium. In general, a type-firm will be scared and will follow a stay small policy as long as its average profit are higher than the average profits from the rigid system, or when Conversely, for > ** z( )<0 and firms choose the rigid system. An important result easily follows. This result is important, since it shows that one of the standard predictions of traditional EPL models, namely result 1, does no longer hold when scared firms exist. Result 3 is further summarized 9 While the model holds wage fixed, the results of modelling EPL as a tax on labour shedding do not change in models with endogenous wage as long as EPL is modelled as a tax. See Garibaldi and Violante (2002) . 10 Note that in the quadratic equation z( )=0 there are two positive roots, but the smallest one is lower than ε * and is economically meaningless, since for values of < ε * firms are totally efficient and can not be scared.
Result 3. A type-firm that is scared has average employment level that is lower than the average employment level in the efficient allocation and in the fully rigid system.

Proof. From Result 2 and from the definition of scared firms it follows immediately that
by looking at Figure 1 , where we report the optimal employment level for a type-firm under three regimes: the efficient allocation, the rigid system, and a stay small policy. Points A and B in the figure refer to the employment level under the efficient allocation, when the firm switches its employment level between l b and l g ( ). Point C refers to the employment level under the rigid system, and l R ( ) is the amount of labour that the firm permanently employs, independently of business conditions. When a firm is scared, its employment level shifts between point A in bad times and point D in good times.
Clearly, the average between A and D is lower than the employment level associated to point C.
[ Figure 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Threshold Effects and Reality: Two Empirical Predictions
Real life firms are obviously much more complicated than the firms described in the toy model, since they differ in many dimensions beyond the single parameter . Different firms face different variety of shocks, employ different workers with different wages, and face different transition rates over the underlying shocks. In addition, firms do not grow instantaneously, but deal with important matching constraints that slow down their growth process, so that employment growth toward a firm optimal position requires time and effort. One could model all these dimensions and calibrate the model to the Italian distribution of firms. But that is neither the purpose of our model, nor the purpose of the paper, which is mainly empirical.
Restricting the attention to the employment level before the threshold, our model suggests that three type of firms coexist: i) firms whose long run position in good times is below the threshold, and have no interest whatsoever in growing beyond the threshold; ii) firms that are growing beyond the threshold toward the no flexible regime and iii) scared firms that are reluctant to hire. Beyond the threshold, flexible and scared firms disappear. Since scared firms are likely to be stuck before the threshold, a key prediction of our analysis is the following persistence prediction, where the threshold refers to the 15 employees threshold of the Italian labour code.
Persistence Prediction: firm level persistence in employment dynamics increases right below the threshold;
While the persistence prediction is our key prediction, at least another prediction can be derived. At the threshold, scared firms face a probability p of reducing their employment base, while they have no chance of increasing their size. There is a key asymmetric behaviour. To derive a clear prediction in this respect, assume that each firm is characterized by more than two levels of the shifter parameter ε , so that firms have more than two possible employment states. Then, it is clear that scared firms at the threshold will not react to small shocks that would increase their employment level, while they certainly react to negative shocks. This leads to our second prediction.
Asymmetric Prediction: Firms at the threshold should respond asymmetrically to positive and negative employment shocks, and react more markedly to negative than positive shocks.
While our focus is mainly on the effects of the EPL threshold, we should recall that in reality there are other institutions that may affect employment dynamics around the 15 employees. The requirement to hire specific categories clearly imply an increase in average labour costs. The same effect should be played by the presence of union related institutions, since beyond the threshold a subset of the workers can spend paid time in off production activities. In both cases, the increase in labour costs should reduce labour demand, and slow down employment growth.
Finally, we should recall that our model and our predictions are only relevant when EPL takes the form of a firing tax. Lazear (1990) has shown that a pure severance payment with flexible wages has no allocative impact on the labour market. Nevertheless, the reinstatement clause of the article 18 of the labour code is more akin to a tax than to a transfer, so that the predictions spelled out above appear appropriate.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical goal of this paper is to study employment dynamics of firms close to the 15 employees threshold, and to check whether such behaviour is consistent with the theoretical predictions outlined above. The empirical exercise can be done successfully only using longitudinal microdata on employment.
The existing literature, albeit scant, does not find any significant evidence of threshold effects.
Anastasia (1999) studies the firm size distribution in the Italian economy and in Veneto (a large Italian region), and does not find any significant bunching of firms close to the threshold. Tattara (1999) focuses on two provinces of the Veneto region, and does not find any significant threshold effect on accession and separation rates of workers, as well as on the probability of growing/shrinking of firms when this implies crossing the 15 employees threshold. Istat (2002) , in its recent annual report, looks at the firm size distribution, and finds a very small bunching of firms at 15 employees. With respect to those studies, the present paper emphasizes the effects of EPL on firm inaction and asymmetric behaviour around the threshold, two dimensions that have not been analysed yet.
The Data
We use a sample of firms drawn from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) archives, called "Standardised DM10m" 11 . The DM10 archive includes the population of private Italian firms that have at least one employee. For each firm, the standardised record covers 6 years and includes the monthly total number of employees.
In a given year, we select all firms that in May employ a worker born on the 10th of March, June, September or December 12 . For sampled firms at year t, we follow the employment behaviour in December of year t and t-1 13 . This sampling method generates a random sample, even though the sampling probability is proportional to firm size. Every year, the sample includes some 900 firms of 14, 15 or 16 employees. For further details on the sample building, see the appendix.
11 In Italian: record normalizzati. 12 We exclude from the records agricultural and public sector firms whose social security records are administered by INPS. 13 In terms of age, our sample requires firms to have at least one year of life, while it is perfectly possible that firms currently active leave the market in the following year.
As we mentioned above, the sampling probability is not constant, but is proportional to the size of the firm at a given point in time 14 . This can be seen by comparing the distribution of firms in our sample to that of the INPS observatory, a yearly report published by the Social Security
Administration. While our sample consists of some 5 percent of the total firms in the Italian economy, it clearly under-samples very small firms. In Table 1 we report the ratio between our firms and the number of firms in the INPS observatory. Such ratio increases from some 2 percent for the 1-5 employees category to 12 percent for firms in the 10-20 employees categories. The over weight in the sample given by large firms can be seen also in Figure 2 , where we report the proportional number of firms between 10 and 20 employees in our sample and in the ASIA archive, the register of all active Italian firms. Notice that the sampling ratio increases smoothly over size.
Even though the number of firms in our sample is proportional to their size, our sample matches very closely the distribution of firms by other dimensions, such as geographical area and industry. These can be easily seen in Table 2 and Table 3 , where we compare our sample with the corresponding distribution in the population of private firms with employees, as reported by statistics of the INPS Observatory.
[ Table 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Figure 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Table 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Table 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Empirical Strategy
The aim of our empirical strategy is to estimate a set of transition matrices for employment size. We consider a subset of the firm size distribution, and we concentrate our analysis on firms with employment in the interval [i=1, I=30 ], so that the 15 employees threshold lies perfectly in the middle of our size interval. We let n i,t be the number of firms that employ i workers at time t and n ij,t+1 the number of firms of size i at t that employ j workers in t+1. We then estimate the following set of transition probabilities
where p ij,t represents the maximum likelihood estimator of the underlying transition probability. When i=j, the transition probability refers to the persistence probability, or the probability of employment inaction. Since there are T years in the sample, and I size categories, the previous estimate generates a dataset of (I*I*T) observations, in which the representative observation is just p ij,t or the probability that a firm of size i switches to size j in t+1. Notice again that our transition probabilities refer only to continuing firms 15 . With this database in hand, we test whether employment dynamics around the 15 14 It is proportional to the size of the firm in May of each year, being May a representative month not affected by seasonality, or peaks of hiring / firing activity or peaks of legal transformations (that in administrative archives at first appear as bunch of hirings / firings). 15 In section 5.3, we look at entry and exit behaviour, and we show that there is no evidence of irregular exit patterns around the threshold.
employees threshold is consistent with the theoretical predictions. We perform tests on employment persistence, on positive and negative employment movements, and on asymmetric behaviour. The spirit of the tests we perform is as follow. First, we fit a parametric relationship linking the transition probabilities to firm size. Second, we test whether the transition probability around the threshold is an outlier vis-à-vis the estimated parametric relationship. In the rest of this section, we briefly specify the methodology for the different tests.
A firm level analysis might represent an alternative approach to the aggregate analysis we perform in this paper. In the literature several papers estimate Gibrat law type of models, although to the best of our knowledge none of them addresses the threshold effect we are focussing on. 16 We choose the transition matrix approach for three reasons: its interpretation is in line with our theoretical predictions; its econometric approach is relatively simple; it fits well with the structure of our dataset (repeated cross sections, with a very limited longitudinal dimension correlated to firm size).
Parametric Persistence Test
If we indicate with p ii,t , the estimate of the persistence probability for firms of size i between time t and t+1, our first step requires estimating the following baseline regression 
which is simply a test that looks for an increase in p ii,t around the 15 employees threshold. This type of test needs to be carried out with different baseline statistical models, and several robustness tests in terms of the size of the dummy.
To estimate this model we use a subset of the I*I*T matrix; we select only the elements in the main diagonal, and obtain an I*T matrix. Notice also that we include only one size dummy in each estimated model, i.e. we estimate the same model several times including size dummies in turn:
and so on.
16 See Sutton (1997) and references therein for a survey of Gibrat's law literature.
Non Parametric (Persistence) Test
While the previous test can highlight the existence of outliers close to the threshold, it ultimately relies on the parametric estimate of a statistical model which is not directly derived from the underlying economic analysis. In a more non parametric fashion, one can perform a bootstrapping exercise for estimating the standard deviations of the probabilities in the original transition matrices. More specifically, we bootstrap k samples of size n, where n is the number of firms used to estimate the transition probability p ii,t . With the k samples in hand, we estimate the standard deviations, and construct confidence intervals of our persistence probability. We perform this exercise separately for each year. 
Test of Asymmetric Behaviour
Let pdiff ikt be the difference between the probability of increasing and decreasing firm size by k positions, so that pdiff ikt reads
,where p [i,i+k] ,t and p [i,i-k] and we test the following assumption 0 : 0 :
so that close to the 15 employees threshold, the probability of moving down by one position is larger than the probability of moving up by one position. The same approach followed in estimating model
[3] is applied here: we select I*T differences in transition probabilities and we include size dummies in turn, as detailed in equations [5] to [7] .
As an intermediate step, one can also perform estimates on pure growth probabilities, even though such predictions are not a straightforward consequence of our analysis. We can apply equations
[2] and [3] to p i,i+1,t and p i,i-1,t as dependent variables in turn and test respectively whether the probability of increasing (reducing) by one employee decreases (increases) below (above) the threshold.
Measurement Issues and Estimation Problems
Measurement Issues
Before proceeding to discussing the results of our analysis, we should realize that firms may take strategic behaviours aimed at avoiding the implementation of the constraint imposed by the threshold.
The dataset we exploit, although rich and detailed in many respects, does not allow us to control for various possibilities, which we discuss next. Specifically, we face three different problems.
First, suppose that a firm reaches 16 employees and wants to avoid the institutional constraint;
it may divide the firm in two new distinct legal entities of less than 15 employees that do not satisfy the requirements imposed by the labour code. All we can do in this respect is using data on entry and exit of firms to check whether firm exit before the threshold is particularly high, suggesting that firms exit before the threshold, just for re-enter the labour market with two different entities below the threshold. Table 4 reports average entry and exit rates by firm size, and shows that such rates decline sharply by firm size, but do not experience any clear pattern around the threshold. In addition, the observation on entry and exit suggests that our focus to continuing firms should not give us obvious problems vis-à-vis the tests that we provide.
Our methodology and our results do not exclude the existence of other, more sophisticated, strategic behaviours aimed at eluding the EPL threshold. For example, a firm may split its activity in two different plants located in different cities when it reaches the 15 employees threshold. However, this can be more costly than facing the EPL provisions.
[ Table 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] Second, our dataset refers to firms, while the threshold rules specified in the labour code refer to establishments. Statistics on the distribution of multiplant firms by size are not easily available; in general small firms are likely to be single establishment firms. Hence, these discrepancies should not dramatically affect our results.
Third, firms close to the threshold may start hiring categories of workers that are not counted in the labour code definition of employment (consultants, apprentices, interim workers). Further, firms close to the threshold may increase the incidence of irregular employment and hire the marginal workers as shadow employees. In these cases, the existence of an EPL threshold has modified firm's employment dynamics, but only a longitudinal dataset that follows the firm across all these dimensions would be able to identify these effects. Our main dataset records only total dependent employment (without distinguishing for apprentices and temporary workers). Nevertheless, we can use a different INPS dataset recording firms located in Turin only (an industrialized province in the North West) from 1990 to 1992 to perform a more detailed analysis. Such dataset distinguishes between apprentices, trainees, and part timers, and allows us to measure the 15 employees relevant for the labour code. We will present the results using this richer dataset (albeit geographically not representative) as a robustness check to the empirical analysis for the entire Italian economy.
Econometric Issues
Since our sampling strategy is proportional to firm size, the precision of the maximum likelihood estimates of the transition probabilities increases with firm size. One may argue that since in our regressions size (or a function of it) is a regressor, this may lead to biased OLS estimates. While this may be partially true, what we want to find is the threshold effect around the 15 employees, and our sample coverage increase smoothly with firm size, as clearly reported in Figure 2 . Since we are mainly interested in the specific effect of moving from 15 to 16 employees, we do not expect any systematic error on this part of the estimates. In other words, we do not see why these problems should be correlated to the 15-employees threshold.
As it is clear from the discussion above, we estimate a transition matrix for each year in our sample, so that our panel data is obtained by pooling over time these different transition matrices. In light of our sampling construction, a similar pool of firms contributes to the estimate of the cell (k,j) of the transition matrix in different years. Since this effect may introduce time correlation in our estimated probabilities, all the results we report refer to robust standard errors, that allow for correlation over time of probabilities referred to the same size class.
Finally, we use OLS when our dependent variable lies between zero and one. This forbids to use predicted values, as they may lie outside the acceptable range, but it does not bias our estimates. . First, the persistence probability declines smoothly with firm size. This should not be surprising, since the relative employment weight of an extra employee declines dramatically with firm size. Second, for the smallest firm size categories the probability density is concentrated around the main diagonal.
Results
Larger firms, conversely, have also a sizable probability of changing their employment size by several employees. Third, the probability of increasing and decreasing by one position declines also as a function of size. The negative relationship is linked to the previous observations. Indeed, conditional on changing their employment status, small firms are more likely to move by just one or two positions.
[ Table 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] Figure 3 reports the implied long-run distribution obtained from the average transition matrix in Table 5 . Clearly, the long-run distribution features a smooth monotonic shape, in a way similar to the empirical distribution observed in the actual data. In particular, the empirical distribution does not feature a dramatic bunching of firms at size 15. Nevertheless, the Figure suggests a "small turbulence"
in the neighbourhood of the threshold, since the long-run number of firms at size 15 is as large as the number of firms at 14 employees. Remarkably, Istat (2002) in its recent annual report, observed a similar small "turbulence" relatively to the 1999 firm size distribution. The results of our analysis are particularly reassuring in this respect, since they are based on a dataset of only 5 percent of firms, and our implied long run distribution ignores the role of entry and exit. We now move to our tests.
[ Figure 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] Figure 4 reports the estimates of the persistence probability by firm size over the period 1987-1995.
Persistence Effects
The Figure where the regressor 1/size captures the underlying smooth relationship between the persistence probability and firm size. Figure 5 reports the solid line of Figure 4 and the benchmark statistic relation estimated according to equation [11] : the persistence probability increases close to the threshold effect, and declines thereafter. Table 6 (in the column labelled Model 1) reports the estimated coefficients obtained by adding one size dummy in turn to the model outlined above. The dummy is positive and strongly significant already at size 13, and reaches a peak at size 15, with a quantitative value that is about 2 percent. When the window size of the dummy is of size 3 (column labelled Model 2), the results do not change much. Figure 6 reports the residuals from the baseline model, and shows that the residuals below the threshold are consistently positive. On the one hand, one can argue that such
pattern is exactly what the theory would predict, since firms below the threshold anticipate the effect.
On the other hand, one can argue that the baseline model is not properly estimated, and it is necessary to reduce the bunching of positive residuals below the threshold. In this respect, we also run a baseline regression in which the size variable enters both in linear and non linear terms, so that
While Figure 7 shows that the residuals are now more randomly distributed around zero in the baseline model, the threshold effect is still present, as highlighted by the results of Table 6 (columns labelled Model 3 and 4). This holds with dummies both of size 1 and 3, and the results are quite similar if the analysis is restricted simply to the manufacturing or the service sector (results are not reported).
Model 3 highlights also a negative and strongly significant dummy at size 16 and 17 (lower persistence probability with respect to the baseline model) consistent with the theoretical predictions. Overall, the 18 However, while the spike at 15 employees is quite robust to different estimation methods, the one at 20 is not.
evidence provided suggests that, on average, firm persistence below the threshold increases by some 1.5 percent relatively to a baseline specification.
[ Table 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Figure 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Figure 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE] From the discussion above it comes out a clear change of regimes at the 15 employees threshold. We can infer from this that the threshold is quite well measured, or that measurement errors discussed in section 5.3.1 do not bias the econometric analysis of the estimated transition probabilities.
In fact, if measurement errors were important, we would observe a grey area around the 15 employees threshold. The next section addresses this point further.
Persistence Effects: Further Robustness Tests
As we argue above, it is also possible to estimate non parametrically the standard deviations of the transition probabilities. This is done in Table 7 , where we report the results of the bootstrapping of 500 samples from our original transition matrix 1994-1995, following the procedure described in Section 5.2.2 19 . The Table reports the standard deviation and the lower and upper tail of a 95 percent confidence interval around the mean, where the confidence intervals are obtained either by assuming a normal distribution of the mean of the various samples or using bootstrapped 5 th and 95 th percentiles corrected for the eventual bias in the bootstrapped mean . Table 7 shows that the confidence interval of the persistence probability at 15 employees is disjoint from the confidence interval of the persistence probability at 16 employees, suggesting that the two estimates are statistically different.
[ Table 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
As we mentioned above, the definition of employment relevant for the labour code is slightly different from the total dependent employment observed in our main sample. The labour code computes 15 employees based on specific definitions, which exclude some employment categories such as apprentices and temporary workers below 9 months. This implies that our total employment variable overestimates the effective threshold, since it includes employment categories that are excluded from a labour code standpoint. While for the overall Italian sample we can not distinguish among different employment categories, and we have to rely on the total dependent employment variable, fortunately, we are able to reconstruct the definition of employment relevant for the labour code for the Turin province, a highly industrialized area in the North. This is an important robustness test, since it gives us the possibility of estimating the difference between the two employment measures.
The results based on the Turin province are reported in Figure 8 and Figure 9 . An immediate flavour of the importance of this problem can be given by the share of firms in which no difference between the two measures of size is recorded: 56%. Figure 8 plots the mean difference between total employment and labour code based employment by firm size (based on total employment) in 1992, 19 Results are unchanged increasing the number of draws or selecting different years.
conditional on the difference being positive. It also plots the share of firms for which the difference is null, i.e. the share of firms that do not use any of the contracts non included in the threshold definition.
Firms up to 15 employees hired an average measure two of labour non computed for the labour code.
Such measure increases to 2.5 as firms reach the 15 employees threshold. Furthermore, beyond the 15 employees threshold there is a clear drop in the share of firms that do not make use of contracts excluded from the labour code definition of employment. Summing up, there is some evidence in favour of a strategic use of contracts to stay below the threshold. Does this bias transition probabilities estimates? Figure 9 plots the persistence probability of employment using the labour code based definition of employment and the total employment for the Turin province. Two observations are relevant. First, the two estimates of the persistence probability are very much correlated, with both variables experiencing a sizable threshold effect. Second, the size of the threshold effect appears more pronounced for the labour code based employment variable. This is exactly what one would expect.
Furthermore, p ii drops at 16 employees using both the aggregate definition of size and the labour code based definition. The largest difference is observed at 12 and 13 employees, not right around the threshold. This is consistent with the fact that the analysis of the full dataset (discussed in the previous paragraph) shows a clear change of regimes at 15 employees. Hence, the characteristics we can highlight in Turin may be more general. Overall, these calculations suggests that the results obtained using total employment are similar to those obtained with a labour code based definition of employment, and that the behaviour of the two variables is highly correlated around the threshold.
[ Figure 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Figure 9 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Asymmetric Behaviour
As we discuss in the methodological session, to test the asymmetric prediction we need to work with the off diagonal terms of the transition matrix. Once we combine the probability of increasing and decreasing employment by one position, we obtain the variable pdiff i1t, which is simply the net probability of growing by one position. This allows us to test the existence of asymmetric effects around the 15 employees threshold. Figure 10 reports the actual and estimated relationship of pdiff i1t , and shows that there are several spikes along the size distribution. Among such spikes, two of them appear particularly large. The first is a positive spike at 14 employees, while the second is a negative spike at 15 employees. The latter spike is consistent with an asymmetric effect driven by the EPL threshold, since it suggests that firms employing 15 employees are more likely to move downward than upward. Table 8 presents the detailed analysis of the asymmetry test, and reports the value of the size dummies for a simple linear model estimated for the whole economy, as well as for the manufacturing and service industries separately. Table 8 suggests that among the various outliers and spikes observed in Figure 14 , the most important ones are the positive and negative spikes close to the threshold. When the transition probability refers to the whole economy, Table 8 suggests that a firm with 15 employees features a decrease in the net probability of moving up by 1.5 percentage points relatively to the simple linear model. This effect increases to 2 percent if the analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector, while is unchanged when referred to the services. The effect is smaller but significantly negative at 16 employees as well. Overall, We said that as an intermediate step one can also perform estimates on pure growth probabilities p i,i+1,t and p i,i-1,t . When we work with the two distinct probabilities, we do not find any evidence of irregular behaviour around the threshold, i.e. testing whether the probability of increasing (reducing) by one employee decreases (increases) below (above) the threshold we are never able to reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effect (results not reported). This might seem surprising, however it should be remembered that such predictions were not a straightforward implication of our toy model.
[ Figure 10 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
[ Table 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The 1990 Reform on Individual Dismissal
In 1990 the Italian legislation on dismissal rules applied to small firms changed drastically.
Before 1990, workers dismissed from small firms could not appeal the employer initiated dismissal, i.e.
before 1990 firms employing less than 15 employees were not obliged to obey to "just-cause" rule for their individual dismissals. Since 1990, small firms are required to justify their dismissal in accordance to the labour code, and whenever the dismissal is ruled unfair, they are obliged to compensate the worker with a severance payment. The legislated severance payment varies between 2.5 and 6 monthly wages, with the actual payment linked to the seniority of the dismissed worker. As far as individual dismissals are concerned, after 1990 the difference in the EPL between small and large firms was reduced to the article 18 of the labour code: while large firms are obliged to rehire unlawfully dismissed workers, small firms can compensate workers through a severance payment.
The effect of this reform is clearly that of making firms below and above the threshold more similar with respect to firing costs for individual dismissals. In this framework, we can test whether employment dynamics on the part of small firms changed significantly with respect to that of larger firms after 1990.
The large firms we consider are those with 20-25 employees; small firms are those employing 9 to 15 workers. We could obviously expand the range of large firms considered, but we prefer to focus on a group that is as close as possible to the threshold. We could also opt for firms with 16-20 employees; however, to avoid spillover effects that might be present right above the threshold we prefer to be conservative.
Our focus is on the persistence behaviour. A stricter EPL on the part of small firms relative to large firms should translate in an increase in relative persistence and employment inaction. Table 9 reports summary statistics on the probability of inaction before and after the 1990 reform for the "small" and the "large" group of firms. We distinguish between the service and the manufacturing sector. Employment persistence increases after 1990 among small firms for both sectors. For the service sector, the persistence probability increases by more than two percentage points, from 29.7 to 32.1. A quantitatively smaller rise is observed in the manufacturing sector. Table 9 shows also that firm level persistence of large firms declines in the service sector while slightly increases in the manufacturing sector. Overall, the difference of the differences is 2.8 in the service sector and 0.56 in the manufacturing sector. The question is whether such difference is statistical significant.
In Table 10 we look for a significant discontinuity in the persistence of small firms relative to large firms. The dependent variable in our regressions is pp itk or the probability of inaction for firms of size i between time t and t+1 in sector k. With this definition of the dependent variable, the panel data we consider reaches 342 observations. The baseline regression model is the following
where γ t is a time dummy, small is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if firm size is between 9
and 15, small91 is a dummy variable identical to small but with positive values only if the year t is larger than 1990, sector is dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the probability refers to the service sector. The coefficient of interest is β, whose estimates are reported in Table 10 (model I), which refers to both the manufacturing and the service sector. The Table suggests that after 1990 the relative persistence of small firms increased significantly by 2.27 percentage points. As predicted, the 1990 reform increased relative inaction on the part of small firms. Column II presents the same model interacting small91 and sector; it finds that the overall effect is still around 2.2 percentage points, even though the effect of the service sector is slightly larger. Finally, the models labelled column III and column IV restrict the analysis to only one sector, reducing the size of the dataset from 342 to 171
observations. The Table suggests It may be tempting to interpret the results of Table 9 and Table 10 as a proper difference in difference estimator, with the persistence on the part of large firms taken as a pure control group, in light of the fact that the legislation on individual dismissal changed only for small firms. We choose not to force this interpretation, and simply interpret the regressions of Tables 10 and 11 as evidence of a regression discontinuity. The reason for this cautious approach is due to the fact that as of 1991 firms with more than 15 employees have the option to undergo a collective dismissal procedure. Such procedure applies whenever a large firm faces a credible risk of bankruptcy, and needs to dismiss at least 5 employees. Firms are obliged to undergo long negotiations with the unions, but whenever the dismissal is authorized no further liabilities are imposed on the firm. Arguably, such reform decreased the persistence of large firms, generating a discontinuity relative to small firms after 1991, exactly as we obtain in Tables 10 and 11 . If one follows this cautious approach, the results of Table 10 and 11 refer to the combined effects of the two reforms.
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Conclusions
This paper fits into the empirical EPL literature, and provides fresh evidence on the links between employment dynamics and asymmetric EPL across the firm size distribution. We focused on the Italian institutional setting, where firms with more than 15 employees are obliged to rehire the dismissed employee when a judge rules the dismissal unfair. Small firms, by contrast, are only obliged to compensate the dismissed worker with a monetary transfer.
The paper found a significant, albeit quantitatively small, threshold effect. Specifically, it found that firms employing 14 and 15 employees have a probability of inaction that is 1.5 percent higher than what different non linear statistical models would predict. Similarly, the difference between the probability of moving down and moving up by one position falls slightly with firm size, but it features a 1.6 percent spike around the 15 employees threshold. Both these results are consistent with the predictions of our toy model of EPL with threshold effects. Finally, the paper tests the effect of the 1990 EPL reform which increased firing costs for small firms relatively to large firms. It finds that relative inaction on the part of small firms increased significantly.
While the paper has provided evidence that firm level dynamics is affected by the existing institutional setting, the results of this paper are not sufficient for arguing that the existing institutional constraints cause the large weight of small firms in the Italian firm size distribution. While our results
are an important first step, further research in this dimension is certainly needed.
Appendix: Sample Selection
The paper uses a sample of firms drawn from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) archives, called "standardised DM10m". The original sample of firms drawn from INPS archive is selected as follows. A 1:90 random sample of employees has been drawn from the O1M INPS archive of employees of private firms 20 . All firms that employed these workers at any point in time during our observation period have been extracted from the standardised DM10m archive: this is the original sample. Hence, in the original sample, the sampling probability is proportional to worker turnover in the firm and it is higher if the firm is growing. In fact: imagine that we select only the firms that in January of a time t year employ a worker that belongs to our employee sample; the sampling probability is 1/90 times the size of the firm. Now imagine that we select firms that in January or February t employ a worker that belongs to our employee sample; the sampling probability is unchanged if the firm did not hire/fire anybody after January; it is unchanged also if the firm fired some workers. It increases if the firm hires somebody after January, and it increases by the number of people hired times 1/90. Even if the firm has the same total number of workers in January and
February, but in the second month it hired and dismissed say 2 workers, the probability of being included in the original sample increases by 2* 1/90. To avoid such non random selection of firms, we extracted from the original sample only the firms that employ a worker that belongs to our employee sample in May t. As said, the sampling probability is 1/90 times the size of the firm. In principle, we could also correct for this proportional sampling, by drawing randomly from the sample just described the appropriate number of firms in each size class. However, this act would further decrease the number of firms in each cell of the transition matrices. Since we need a deeply disaggregate analysis we decided not to decrease further the sample size, but to increase the precision of the estimates we present. The Econometric implications of this choice are discussed in the text.
20 See Contini (2002) for details on INPS data and on this dataste in particolar. 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Ratio 
